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The number of people using fitness devices and mobile health applications creates unprecedented amounts of health-
related fitness data. In the United States, healthcare regulations do not consider the data that these devices collect as 
protected health information when no covered entity is involved; therefore, the law does not provide such data with the 
same legal protections as an individual’s health records. Thus, users must ensure that they keep their data safe from 
potential data breaches and malicious activities. In this study, we analyze users’ motivations to implement safeguards 
to protect their private health-related fitness data. To test user motivation, we issued wearable activity tracking 
devices and an associated online health fitness data account to students. We instructed the students about how to 
use the fitness device and how the device connected to the user’s phone and Web-based application. We then had 
them complete a survey to determine how they form their threat perceptions and other factors influencing their 
avoidance motivations for computer-security incidents. With the exception of safeguard cost and privacy concerns, 
results support a revised threat calculus in the TTAT model and the original model constructs. 
Keywords: Technology Threat Avoidance Theory, Security, Privacy, Wearable Activity Trackers, Fitness Data, Fitbit. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, products for tracking fitness and health-related data have inundated the wearable 
technology market. Forecasters predict the use of fitness wearables would jump from the 127.7 million in 
2017 devices to over 240 million by 2021 and that smart watches will increase from 71.4 million to 121 
million users in that same period (Lamkin, 2017). These wearable devices couple with a user’s phone and 
connect to the Internet via mobile health applications. As such, they generate an unprecedented amount 
of data related to individual health and fitness activities and present new opportunities for security 
breaches and other malicious activities (Barcena, Wueest, & Lau, 2014). 
How users perceive threats to their data and the steps they take to protect their information play a key role 
in whether they avoid security problems. Health information data has greater value for hackers than 
financial data because unauthorized access provides the information needed to file fraudulent medical 
claims and receive unauthorized payments or medical treatment (Yaraghi, 2016). Indeed, in the United 
States, data breaches have compromised 50 percent of the population’s health information (Widup, 
Bassett, Hylender, Rudis, & Spitler, 2015). While personal fitness data do not fit into the legal confines of 
personal health information, wearable technology applications collect many related elements, such as 
users’ full names, birthdates, mailing addresses, email addresses, photographs (Barcena et al., 2014), 
passwords (Cyr, Horn, Miao, & Specter, 2014), weight, heart rate, sleep patterns (Weinstein, 2015), 
activities, and GPS location (McGee, 2016). In the absence of the protections that the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH) act and other regulations provide, users must recognize the risks and have the 
motivation to protect their data. Fortunately, some fitness technology vendors recognize the serious 
nature of these threats and offer HIPAA-compliant protections even though they do not need to follow 
HIPAA requirements since the HIPAA does not consider them as covered entities (Fitbit, 2015). 
While the threat from using Fitbits and other wearable technology devices might seem innocuous, a vector 
of attacks exists between the Fitbit device and the user’s smartphone via Bluetooth and continues 
between the smartphone and user’s private data stored on the Fitbit website (Cyr et al., 2014). Further, 
some devices send plaintext passwords over SMS (Do, Martini, & Choo, 2017). Recently, cybercriminals 
used Fitbit accounts to collect customer data, such as their GPS history/location and the time they 
typically went to sleep (McGee, 2016). This type of information poses not only a data threat but also a 
personal security threat. 
Since users must protect their own fitness data, we need to know what motivates users to avoid threats 
and take protective actions. Researchers have studied various theoretical models when analyzing user 
motivations to avoid threats including protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975; Barcena et al., 
2014) and technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) (Liang & Xue, 2009). In TTAT, user perceived 
severity and perceived susceptibility represent key constructs for evaluating threat perceptions and 
predicting user avoidance behaviors. 
In this study, we examine the effect of perceived susceptibility, threat, and severity on the resulting user 
threat avoidance motivations and behaviors. Thus, we evaluate and extend TTAT in the wearable activity 
tracker context to understand how users perceive threats; what motivates them to avoid threats; how they 
react to threats; and what safeguards, costs, and concerns influence those motivations and behaviors. 
2 Literature Review 
Researchers have long examined people’s perceptions of threats and privacy. Protection motivation 
theory and technology threat avoidance theory represent two important theories that explain user 
perceptions and motivations. 
2.1 Protection Motivation Theory 
Protection motivation theory (PMT), which Rogers (1975) originally proposed, identifies how individuals 
develop appropriate responses to threats. PMT suggests that, prior to reacting to threats, individuals 
navigate a thought process that ultimately determines their response. Initially, PMT suggested individuals 
assign a level of severity to the threat while simultaneously gauging the likelihood that the threat would 
affect them personally. In addition, individuals also examine possible responses to the threat and the 
responses’ ability to protect them. As a result, the appraised severity, expectancy of exposure, and belief 
in efficacy of coping response interact to motivate individuals to implement a protective mechanism and 
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ultimately respond (Rogers, 1975). Figure 1 shows the constructs and relationships in the original PMT 
model. 
 
Figure 1. Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975) 
Rogers (1983) modified PMT to include susceptibility and vulnerability, while Maddux and Rogers (1983) 
extended it to include self-efficacy as an integral construct for forming protection motivations. They 
proposed that individuals must not only believe the response mechanism will effectively protect them from 
a threat but also believe in their ability to implement the protection mechanism. In their study, Maddux and 
Rogers (1983) confirmed self-efficacy as an additional construct for predicting intentions to implement 
protective responses.  
Many studies have analyzed protection motivation in a variety of contexts. Studies with PMT as the 
foundational theory have incorporated the concept of protecting oneself from threats associated with using 
technology. Specifically, PMT has served as the basis for studies in the context of wireless security 
systems, information security compliance, Internet usage, anti-virus software, and mobile devices (Woon, 
Tan, & Low, 2005; Lee, Larose, & Rifon, 2008; Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009; 
Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Vance, Siponen, & Pahnila, 2012; Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015; 
Chou & Chou, 2016; Tsai et al., 2016). 
While researchers have widely used PMT to determine user protection motivations, mixed results indicate 
it is not the best fit for explaining why users implement behaviors to avoid technological threats. Woon et 
al. (2005) analyzed the factors that cause homeowners to implement protective behaviors when using a 
wireless security system. They tested the full PMT model and added response cost as a construct. Their 
findings confirmed the significance of perceived severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response 
cost. However, they found that perceived susceptibility was not significant in determining protective 
behaviors. Likewise, other studies have identified that perceived susceptibility was not significant in 
predicting protective motivations. The context of these studies included Internet usage and compliance 
with information security policies in the work environment (Herath & Rao, 2009; Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010; Vance et al., 2012; Yoon, Hwang, & Kim, 2012; Tsai et al., 2016). Dang-Pham and Pittayachawan 
(2015) studied students’ protection motivations when using personal devices at university and at home. 
Interestingly, they found perceived susceptibility predicted protective motivations in the university setting 
but not at home (Dang-Pham & Pittayachawan, 2015). Conversely, perceived susceptibility was significant 
in the context of Internet usage and compliance with information security policies in other studies (Lee et 
al., 2008; Chenoweth et al., 2009; Ifinedo, 2012). Although these studies had similar contexts, they found 
different results regarding the influence that perceived susceptibility has on protection motivation. 
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PMT studies have also returned mixed results regarding perceived severity, self-efficacy, cost, and 
safeguard effectiveness. Lee et al. (2008) found that perceived severity had no significance in the context 
of online behaviors and information security policy compliance. Ifinedo (2012) found that cost was not 
significant in determining compliance with information security policies. Chenoweth et al. (2009) found that 
self-efficacy failed to predict protective motivations for college students in an online environment, and 
Chou and Chou (2016) found that cost was not significant in the context of teachers’ motivation to avoid 
technological threats. The prevalence of mixed results among studies based on PMT highlights the need 
for a model that can better determine the process by which individuals develop intentions and behaviors 
for avoiding technological threats. 
2.2 Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
The technology threat avoidance theory (TTAT) that Liang and Xue (2009) propose resembles protection 
motivation theory but better suits IT-related disciplines. The theory proposes that users are motivated to 
employ safeguards when they perceive threats, which suggests that threat perceptions influence users’ 
motivation to invoke a safeguarding mechanism. Liang and Xue (2010) examined these associations 
including users’ perceptions about susceptibility, severity, threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard 
costs, self-efficacy, avoidance motivation, and avoidance behavior.  
Liang and Xue (2010) drew from PMT and incorporated threat appraisal into the TTAT model. They 
posited perceived severity and perceived susceptibility as antecedents to perceived threat. They defined 
perceived severity as the level of harm malicious threats would cause the user. They defined perceived 
susceptibility as the likelihood that malicious threats would produce negative consequences for the user. 
Additionally, they expected perceived severity and perceived susceptibility to interact with each other to 
increase threat perceptions (Liang & Xue, 2010). They expected these two constructs to explain the level 
of a user’s threat perceptions, which they termed the threat calculus. 
The TTAT model also incorporated a coping appraisal process similar to PMT, which included the self-
efficacy, safeguard effectiveness, and safeguard cost. Liang and Xue (2010) defined self-efficacy as 
users’ perception of their ability to implement the safeguarding measure. They defined safeguard 
effectiveness as users’ perception that the safeguarding measure would actually provide protection. They 
defined safeguard cost as the impact implementing the safeguarding measure would have on users, 
which included monetary and time implications. Liang and Xue (2010) proposed these constructs would 
affect avoidance motivation. Additionally, they anticipated an interaction between safeguard effectiveness 
and perceived threat would negatively affect avoidance motivation. 
Behavioral constructs in the TTAT model included avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior. Liang 
and Xue (2010) defined avoidance motivation as users’ level of motivation to avoid technology threats by 
implementing protective actions. They defined avoidance behaviors as the actual actions taken to avoid 
the threats. Figure 2 shows the constructs in the original technology threat avoidance theory. 
From reviewing the TTAT literature, we confirmed that researchers have used the theory in many different 
IT contexts and that it has much flexibility in explaining threat-avoidance behavior. Prior studies have 
revealed inconsistencies regarding the significance of severity, susceptibility, and the interaction between 
the two antecedents of threat. The lack of consistent results suggests a need to review the placement of 
susceptibility in the threat calculus. In their original test, Liang and Xue (2010) found both severity and 
susceptibility to be significant in determining threat perceptions; however, they found that the interaction 
between severity and susceptibility was not significant in the threat-appraisal process.  
Subsequent studies that used the TTAT model continued to return mixed results regarding the 
relationships between susceptibility, severity, and threat, which calls into question the associations 
between these constructs and their influence on threat perceptions. In the context of game-based phishing 
attacks, Arachchilage and Love (2013) found susceptibility, severity, and the interaction between the two 
to be significant in determining threat perceptions. Other studies in the contexts of online threat avoidance 
and compliance with password security guidelines found susceptibility and severity to be significant but 
did not test the interaction between the two (Mwagwabi, 2015; Chen & Zahedi, 2016). 
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Figure 2. Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (Liang & Xue, 2010) 
Young, Carpenter, and McLeod (2016) replicated the full TTAT model in the context of avoiding malware. 
They found a significant association between severity and threat. However, they did not find support for a 
relationship between susceptibility and threat or for an interaction between susceptibility and severity. 
Manzano (2012) tested the full TTAT model in the context of users’ avoiding IT threats at home. The 
author surveyed two groups for comparison. The first group comprised individuals who worked in a non-IT 
setting. The second group comprised IT experts. The author surveyed both groups to assess their IT-
avoidance practices at home. The author found mixed results for the threat-appraisal process. 
Specifically, the author found support for relationship between susceptibility and threat for the first group 
but not for the second. Both groups indicated a significant relationship between severity and threat, while 
neither group supported the interaction between susceptibility and severity. Das and Khan (2016) 
incorporated susceptibility, severity, and the interaction between severity and susceptibility into an 
expectancy-based model to analyze the steps smartphone users take to avoid malicious threats via their 
devices. Das and Khan conducted their study on three groups: iPhone users, Blackberry users, and 
Android users. Susceptibility and severity were significant only for Blackberry users. The authors did not 
find support for an interaction between susceptibility and severity. 
Other studies that have tested a partial TTAT model have also returned mixed results. Vance, Anderson, 
Kirwan, and Eargle (2014) tested severity and susceptibility in the context of determining individuals’ risk-
taking behaviors by measuring their responses to security warnings. Vance et al. (2014) tested 
participants prior to experiencing a malware incident and again after experiencing a malware incident. 
They found mixed results between the pre-test and post-test regarding the significance of susceptibility 
and severity in predicting risk-taking behaviors. In the pre-test (before a security incident), neither 
susceptibility nor severity were significant for either group. In the post-test (following a security incident), 
susceptibility was significant for both groups, but severity was not significant. 
In the context of detecting and avoiding fake websites, Zahedi, Abbasi, and Chen (2015) included severity 
and susceptibility in their model’s threat appraisal. They surveyed two groups: participants who used 
online banking websites and participants who used online pharmacies. The authors did not find support 
for susceptibility for either group, but they did find support for severity for participants who used online 
banking sites. 
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2.3 Inconsistent Results 
The number of studies that have used TTAT in part or in whole to analyze threat appraisals and the 
resulting avoidance behaviors provide support for TTAT’s applicability in information security research. 
However, the lack of consistent results regarding the significance of susceptibility and severity in the 
threat-appraisal process suggests that revising the TTAT model might better explain how individuals 
develop threat perceptions. Table 1 summarizes studies that detail the varied associations of perceived 
susceptibility, severity, and threat. 
Table 1. Severity, Susceptibility, and Threat Perceptions (Young et al., 2018) 
Author Size Population Notes Sus. Sus. X Sev. Sev. Threat 














Experimental group of volunteers 
and control group of IT 
professionals 







Game-based phishing attack Sig. Sig. Sig. Sig. 





Replication of TTAT broadened to 
the context of malware 
NS NS Sig. Sig. 







Comparing online threats Western 
vs. Eastern 
Sig 0 Sig. Sig. 
Mwagwabi (2015) 419 Internet users 
Exposure to hacking as a 
predictor of vulnerability 
Sig. 0 Sig. Sig. 





Partial model of risk, severity, 
susceptibility, and threat 
NS 0 NS 0 





Only uses severity and 
susceptibility 
NS 0 Mixed 0 






Uses TAM intention and behavior; 
not really TTAT 
0 0 0 Sig. 
Note: sig. = significant, NS = not significant, 0 = not tested 
2.4 Privacy 
Increases in the data that mobile devices and wearable technologies collect suggest that theoretical 
frameworks should also incorporate privacy concerns as a key construct in determining users’ avoidance 
behaviors. Matt and Peckelsen (2016) added privacy concerns and previous privacy experience as control 
variables in research examining users’ intentions to use privacy-enhancing technologies. They adapted 
the privacy concerns construct for their study from Dinev and Hart (2006), who described privacy 
concerns as perceptions that individuals develop in response to organizations’ sharing their personal data 
for economic gain. Matt and Peckelsen (2016) operationalized past experience as participants’ prior 
exposure to privacy violations. They found that both privacy concerns and previous privacy experience 
had a strong influence on users’ intentions to implement privacy-enhancing technologies.  
Some studies have emphasized the need to understand how individuals develop their privacy concerns 
and, therefore, focused on identifying antecedents to privacy concerns. Junglas, Johnson, and Spitzmüller 
(2008) explored the importance of personality traits in predicting concern for privacy in the context of using 
location-based services. They confirmed the personality traits agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
openness to experience significantly influenced concern for privacy. Xu, Dinev, Smith, and Hart (2011) 
examined the factors that influence privacy concerns in the context of organizational information practices. 
Their research confirmed disposition to value privacy, privacy risk, and privacy control had strong effects 
on privacy concerns. 
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Other research has analyzed users’ privacy perceptions in the context of online privacy. Clemons and 
Wilson (2015) surveyed families and teenagers in eight countries to measure their privacy concerns. 
Specifically, they examined how external organizations mined students’ text messages and school-issued 
email accounts for data so that they could conduct targeted ad campaigns. Although the level of concern 
varied among countries and between parents and their students, all groups surveyed had significant 
concerns about the invasion of privacy and the potential consequences. In the context of online shopping, 
Dinev and Hart (2006) incorporated an extension of privacy in their model to analyze an apparent paradox 
between consumers’ stated privacy concerns and their online-shopping behaviors. They found that an 
increased perception of Internet privacy risk positively affects privacy concerns. As a result, increased 
Internet privacy concerns negatively affected the willingness to provide personal information in 
transactions on the Internet. 
In summary, many studies have included privacy in research, especially in the context of online activities 
and organizational usage of personal data. The proliferation of electronically available data increases the 
need to understand these interactions. Therefore, we need to consider the impact that privacy concerns 
have on individual behavior and account for that impact in health information research.  
3 Research Questions 
In this study, we examine how people judge threats, perceive privacy, and are motivated to avoid harm. 
Inconsistent results in prior work bring into question the relationships associated with threat determination, 
privacy, and user motivation. Based on the literature and results from previous studies, we developed two 
research questions (RQ): 
RQ1: How do perceived susceptibility and severity influence an individual’s threat perceptions? 
RQ2: Do privacy perceptions affect user motivation to implement technology safeguards? 
We derived a final research question from previous TTAT studies with consistent results. The remaining 
constructs in our model, including avoidance motivation, self-efficacy, safeguard cost, safeguard 
effectiveness, and avoidance behavior were identical in placement to the original TTAT model. Although 
these constructs returned consistent results in prior studies, revisions to the threat calculus and the 
introduction of privacy concerns required us to determine reliability and validity, and therefore analyze the 
complete model. To be consistent with prior research, we fashioned the following research question to 
include these relationships: 
RQ3:  Will the relationships in the original TTAT model remain significant given the changes to the 
threat calculus? 
4 Research Model and Hypotheses 
In this study, we extend and refine the full TTAT model. RQ1 examines the relationship between 
perceived susceptibility and severity of threats when individuals develop threat perceptions. Researchers 
have found mixed results for susceptibility’s occurrence or timing when determining its impact on threat 
perceptions. In our study, we identify whether users must first feel susceptible to a threat in order to form a 
perception about its severity. If perceived susceptibility is an antecedent to perceived severity, removing 
the interaction with perceived susceptibility as Liang and Xue (2010) tested may indicate whether users 
have stronger threat perceptions as a direct result of susceptibility. Replicating the original Liang and Xue 
(2010) work, Young et al. (2016) did not find support for an association between susceptibility and threat, 
nor the interaction between susceptibility and severity; therefore, in this research, we examine perceived 
susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity. 
Liang and Xue (2010) did not consider privacy concerns; however, we posit that privacy concerns affect 
user motivation. Therefore, we revised the model and inserted the privacy construct into the model as an 
antecedent to avoidance motivation. Due to the sensitive nature of data that fitness wearables collect, our 
model examines whether privacy concerns increased avoidance motivation. Figure 3 shows the refined 
relationships between the constructs and their associated hypotheses. 
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Figure 3. Model and Hypotheses 
We developed hypotheses to examine the refined TTAT model. In response to prior works and to explore 
the modified relationships between these constructs, we position perceived susceptibility as an 
antecedent to perceived severity in the threat calculus. We posit the following hypotheses from the 
research questions and model:  
H1a: Perceived susceptibility positively influences perceived severity. 
H1b: Perceived severity positively influences threat perceptions. 
H1c: Perceived threat positively influences avoidance motivation. 
Previous research has focused on the impact that privacy concerns have on technology acceptance. 
However, little research has incorporated privacy concerns in the threat-avoidance context (Herath et al., 
2014). Thus, we examine the impact that privacy concerns have on threat avoidance and hypothesize 
that: 
H2: Privacy concerns positively influence avoidance motivation. 
In order to evaluate their motivation to avoid malicious threats to IT, users must first assess their ability to 
do so. Self-efficacy refers to the certainty that users place on their ability to implement protective 
measures. Users who believe in their abilities are typically more likely to enact a safeguard (Liang & Xue, 
2010). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Self-efficacy positively influences avoidance motivation. 
Safeguard measures require financial and intellectual commitments from users, which causes them to 
evaluate the safeguard cost. Users must determine if the financial burden or intellectual impact will 
impede their productivity. Users may be less likely to adopt safeguarding measures that require an undue 
amount of time, hassle, or money (Liang & Xue, 2010). Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4: Safeguard cost negatively influences avoidance motivation. 
While safeguard cost and self-efficacy are important for determining avoidance motivation, user 
perceptions about safeguard effectiveness are equally important. Unless users perceive the safeguard to 
be an effective tool for avoiding malware, they are unlikely to implement it (Liang & Xue, 2010). Therefore, 
we hypothesize that: 
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H5: Safeguard effectiveness positively influences avoidance motivation. 
Prior research has demonstrated a strong relationship between motivation and behavior (Liang & Xue, 
2010; Arachchilage & Love, 2013). Once users develop avoidance motivation, they are likely to implement 
the safeguarding measure (Liang & Xue, 2010; Young et al., 2016). In keeping with consistent results from 
prior studies, we hypothesize that: 
H6: Avoidance motivation positively influences avoidance behavior. 
5 Methodology 
We used a survey to test the revised TTAT model and resulting hypotheses. The survey asked 
respondents about their perceptions about their susceptibility to threats and about threats’ severity while 
using wearable activity trackers that connected via Bluetooth to their phones and, subsequently, to the 
Fitbit website via the Internet. We briefly explained Bluetooth and network vulnerabilities to the subjects 
during a pre-survey overview of security issues that can often occur when one uses wearable activity 
trackers in general. 
We adapted 38 items that we used in the survey from the measures that Liang and Xue (2010) used. We 
adapted the four questions we used to assess privacy concerns from Matt and Peckelsen (2016). Other 
researchers previously validated all the TTAT measures we adapted; however, we revalidated them due 
to minor wording changes based on reviewing the literature. For example, “malware” was more 
encompassing than “spyware”, so we updated the terminology (Manzano, 2012; Young et al., 2018). We 
modified some items to fit our study’s context (i.e., the Fitbit system). The original TTAT items used mixed 
scales drawn from both semantic differential and Likert-based questions. Some items ranged from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree, others from not at all confident to totally confident, and still others from 
innocuous to extremely devastating (Liang & Xue, 2010; Young et al., 2018). We standardized the scale 
for this study to provide consistent wording for each measure and used a typical seven-point Likert scale 
construction that included strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, 
somewhat agree, agree, and strongly agree.  
5.1 Data Collection  
First-year college students who had not previously used a Fitbit activity tracker served as the participants 
for our study. We sent the participant recruitment survey to 3,301 incoming first-year students who we 
selected based on their age and their college classification. Of that number, 747 students completed the 
recruitment survey, and we invited the first 100 that responded to participate in the study. Subsequently, 
we held a training session in which we issued the 98 students that attended a Fitbit and overviewed the 
Fitbit system, how it functioned, and the types of data it collected. After the presentation, we asked the 
participants to respond to the data-collection survey. The survey instrument contained measures for the 
latent variable constructs and demographic variables. In all, the survey contained nine blocks of items. 
Each block contained between two and six Likert-scale construct questions (see Appendix B). 
6 Analysis 
We collected 92 survey responses from 98 participants (a 94% response rate). We designed our study to 
examine first-year students’ activities and perceptions; therefore, all respondents unsurprisingly selected 
into the 18-24 age bracket. With regard to gender, 30.4 percent of the participants were male, and the 
remaining 69.6 percent selected female. The sample comprised various ethnicities (40% Hispanic, 39% 
White, 13% African American, 7% Asian, and 2% other). Our design constrained the participants’ highest 
education level: 44 percent reported having a high school degree and 52 percent had some college 
credits. 
We analyzed the data using SmartPLS (Ringle, Wende, & Will, 2005). This statistical tool can evaluate 
both large and small sample sizes (Chin, 1998) and can effectively handle interval or ratio responses. 
Because SmartPLS uses bootstrap resampling, data does not have to be normally distributed (Vinzi, 
Trinchera, & Amato, 2010).  
In this work, we modeled all items as reflective indicators of latent variables. We followed a two-step 
approach to analysis by first considering the reliability and validity of the measurement model and then 
assessing the structural model (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Reliability demonstrates that the items 
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consistently reflect the underlying latent variable, whereas validity ensures the instrument measures the 
intended relationships in the model (DeVellis, 2003; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). We first evaluated 
individual item consistency by using Cronbach’s alpha. All items scored higher than 0.70 and, thus, 
demonstrated adequate reliability. Perceived threat scored the lowest at 0.85. Table 2 provides the 
Cronbach’s alpha values and average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct. 
Table 2. Cronbach’s Alpha and AVE 
 Cronbach’s alpha Composite reliability AVE 
Perceived susceptibility 0.94 0.95 0.77 
Perceived severity 0.93 0.95 0.77 
Perceived threat 0.85 0.90 0.68 
Privacy concerns 0.98 0.98 0.93 
Self-efficacy 0.94 0.95 0.78 
Safeguard cost 0.86 0.90 0.75 
Safeguard 
effectiveness 
0.98 0.98 0.89 
Avoidance motivation 0.98 0.99 0.97 
Avoidance behavior 0.93 0.96 0.93 
After establishing construct reliability, we assessed construct validity by testing both convergent and 
discriminant validity. Discriminant validity establishes a clear difference between constructs (Trochim, 
2006) by measuring the amount of shared variance between the latent variables in the model as opposed 
to the amount of variance due to error (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). To substantiate discriminant validity, one 
should calculate the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) and ensure the value is at least 
.50. Values greater than 0.70 indicate that one can attribute a large amount of variance to a specific 
variable (Alarcón & Sánchez, 2015). One then compares the AVE values for the latent variables to the 
correlations with the other constructs. As long as the AVE values are higher than the correlations with the 
other constructs, the model demonstrates discriminant validity. The AVE values were greater than any 
correlational value by construct, and the factors had greater on-factor than off-factor loadings; therefore, 
the measurement model demonstrated satisfactory discriminant validity (see Table 3). 































































































































































Avoidance behavior 4.05 1.68 0.93         
Avoidance motivation 3.63 1.42 0.46 0.97        
Safeguard effectiveness 2.98 1.19 0.28 0.46 0.89       
Perceived severity 4.26 1.23 0.01 0.27 0.30 0.77      
Perceived susceptibility 4.66 1.25 -.08 0.08 0.09 0.40 0.77     
Perceived threat 4.49 1.69 0.13 0.43 0.32 0.51 0.27 0.68    
Privacy concerns 5.30 1.46 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.32 0.51 0.33 0.93   
Safeguard cost 3.95 1.53 -.00 0.14 0.35 0.27 0.19 0.31 0.24 0.75  
Self-efficacy 2.92 1.32 0.35 0.45 0.44 0.20 0.01 0.35 -.10 0.40 0.78 
Note: bolded values on the diagonal represent the average variance extracted (AVE). 
Convergent validity confirms the items measured the intended constructs. Gefen, Rigdon, and Straub 
(2011) suggest that one evaluate the convergent validity of individual items via a factor analysis. Basically, 
all factor loadings for individual items should be greater than 0.70 (see Appendix A). The lowest on-factor 
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loading for our data was 0.75, and all constructs demonstrated adequate convergent validity. In summary, 
our model demonstrated adequate reliability and validity. 
To assess common method bias, we performed a factor analysis and examined both the Eigenvalues and 
scree plots of our unrotated solution. Not constraining the number of factors in our 44-item survey 
produced a nine-factor solution with Eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and accounted for 81.77 percent of the 
variance in this sample. Next, we ran the factor analysis and constrained the number of solutions to a 
single factor. The unifocal solution had an Eigenvalue of 12.27 and accounted for only 27.87 percent of 
the variance in this sample. Testing for common method variance in this post hoc way can detect bias 
conditions found in survey research (Fuller, Simmering, Atinc, Atinc, & Babin, 2016); therefore, these 
results indicate that common method variance did not likely affect our sample. 
7 Results 
The above analysis generated significant results. We calculated the R2 values or variances extracted for 
all dependent variables. The model accounted for a significant portion of the variance in avoidance 
behavior, avoidance motivation, perceived threat, and perceived severity. After determining the path 
coefficients and variance values, we performed a test of significance for each path. Table 4 reports the 
sample mean, standard deviation, t-statistic, and corresponding p value for each relationship specified in 
the model. 











Perceived susceptibility  perceived 
severity 
Yes 0.40 0.09 4.33 0.01 
H1b Perceived severity  perceived threat Yes 0.51 0.08 6.31 0.01 
H1c Perceived threat  avoidance motivation Yes 0.24 0.12 2.07 0.04 
H2 Privacy concerns  avoidance motivation No 0.13 0.10 1.30 0.20 
H3 Self-efficacy  avoidance motivation Yes 0.33 0.11 3.11 0.01 
H4 Safeguard cost  avoidance motivation No -0.20 0.11 1.93 0.06 
H5 Safeguard effectiveness  avoid motivation Yes 0.29 0.08 3.62 0.01 
H6 Avoidance motivation  avoidance behavior Yes 0.46 0.09 5.20 0.01 
The model’s beta coefficients indicated significant support for the hypothesized relationships except for H2 
and H4. Specifically, perceived susceptibility had a significant effect on perceived severity (β = .40, ρ < 
0.01, R2 = .16), which supports H1. Perceived severity had a significant effect on perceived threat (β = .51, 
ρ < 0.01, R2 = .26), which supports H1b. Perceived threat had a significant effect on avoidance motivation 
(β = .24, ρ = 0.04), which supports H1c. Privacy concerns did not have a significant effect on avoidance 
motivation (β = .13, ρ < 0.20), which does not support H2. Self-efficacy (β = .33, ρ < 0.01) had a significant 
effect on avoidance motivation, which supports H3. Safeguard cost had a negative and non-significant 
association with avoidance motivation (β = -.20, ρ = 0.06), which does not support H4. Safeguard 
effectiveness had a significant effect on avoidance motivation (β = .29, ρ < 0.01), which supports H5. 
Finally, avoidance motivation had a significant effect on avoidance behavior (β = .46, ρ < 0.01), which 
supports H6. Figure 4 shows the results.  
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Figure 4. Results 
8 Discussion 
In this study, we examine users’ motivations for implementing safeguarding measures against potential 
threats. We revise the TTAT model to measure user perceptions and motivations in the context of a 
wearable activity-tracker system. Due to mixed results in prior studies, we propose perceived susceptibility 
as an antecedent to perceived severity in the threat calculus. When compared to the original TTAT test 
and other studies based on the TTAT model, our study further confirms the model’s suitability for 
evaluating avoidance motivations and behaviors and offers an alternative approach for modeling 
antecedents that involve perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, and perceived threat. 
Due to the sensitive nature of data that activity-tracker systems collect, we extend the model to include a 
privacy construct to determine whether privacy concerns increase avoidance motivation. Surprisingly, we 
found that privacy concerns were not significant in determining avoidance motivation. Wearable fitness 
devices collect sensitive data that resembles protected health information. However, user responses 
suggested that they lacked concern about the data that the devices collect—possibly due to our 
participants’ age (i.e., 18-24). Also, participants in this age group may be less likely to have experienced 
severe consequences from data breaches and privacy violations. Additionally, we note that privacy 
concerns were more highly correlated with perceived susceptibility, severity, and threat. We did not 
analyze the associations between these variables and only tested the relationships between privacy 
concerns and avoidance motivation and avoidance behavior. 
In Table 5, we show the significance of each construct in our own and prior studies. As the table shows, 
avoidance motivation significantly predicted avoidance behavior in each study. Perceived threat and 
safeguard effectiveness both had a significant and positive influence on avoidance motivation. Likewise, 
perceived severity had a significant and strong effect on perceived threat. Safeguard cost had a significant 
but negative influence on avoidance motivation in most studies, which indicates that, as safeguard costs 
increase, users have less motivation to implement the safeguard measure. However, for our study, 
safeguard cost was only marginally significant (p = .06). Self-efficacy generally indicated a significant 
effect on avoidance motivation, although one study found it was not significant. Additionally, perceived 
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Table 5. Comparison of TTAT Results across Similar Studies 














Perceived severity (SEV→THR) (.27) .01 (.50) .01 (.59) .01 (.57) .01 (.51) .01 
Perceived susceptibility (SUS→THR) (.41) .01 (.36) .01 (.05) .24 (.18) .01  
Perceived susceptibility (SUS→SEV→THR)    (.37) .01 (.40) .01 
Perceived severity x perceived susceptibility (.10) NS (.59) .01 (-.02) .71   
Perceived threat (.26) .01 (.39) .01 (.10) .06 (.12) .01 (.24) .04 
Avoidance motivation (.43) .01 (.39) .01 (.75) .01 (.82) .01 (.46) .01 
Distrust propensity    (.10) .01  
Impulsivity    (.06) .05  
Privacy concerns     (.13) .20 
Risk propensity    (-.16) .01  
Safeguard cost (-.14) .05 (-.11) .05 (-.30) .01 (-.32) .01 (-.20) .06 
Safeguard effectiveness (.33) .01 (.39) .01 (.33) .01 (.42) .01 (.29) .01 
Self-efficacy (.19) .05 (.16) .01 (.10) .01 (.03) .28 (.33) .01 
Threat x safeguard effectiveness (-.18) .05 (.45) .01 (-.02) .67   
Note: (B) p = path value and p value; NS = not significant 
The modifications we made to the TTAT model returned interesting results. For instance, positioning 
perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity in the threat calculus resulted in a strong 
and significant effect, which suggests that users might first evaluate the likelihood of falling victim to 
malware before they evaluate the severity of such a threat. In their larger study, Carpenter et al. (2018) 
repeated this relationship and found it to be significant, which indicates that revising the threat calculus 
can provide more consistent results than previous versions of the TTAT model. Future studies measuring 
the modified threat calculus would help determine if the revisions apply in various contexts. 
Our results provide insight into users’ motivations to avoid malicious IT threats. Prior research confirming 
the original TTAT model’s suitability for evaluating technology threat avoidance verifies the foundational 
constructs’ stability. However, the lack of consistency in the variables associated with the threat calculus 
indicates the need to consider other factors. Additional variables such as risk propensity and distrust 
propensity may more richly measure the threat-appraisal process (Young et al., 2018). As the need to 
better understand users’ threat-avoidance motivations and behaviors increases, a modified and improved 
TTAT model might benefit researchers. 
9 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine and refine the threat calculus in TTAT in order to provide a more representative 
model for analyzing user motivations to employ safeguard measures. In addition to the revised threat 
calculus in our model, we introduce a privacy construct to further extend and analyze user motivations. 
While privacy concerns and safeguard cost were not significant in our study, we found full support for the 
revised threat calculus that explored perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to perceived severity rather 
than an antecedent to threat perceptions. However, the variance in perceived threat and avoidance 
motivation was lower in this study than in the original TTAT model that Liang and Xue (2010) tested, 
which indicates other variables may affect threat perceptions and avoidance motivation. To further explain 
the variance in threat perceptions, researchers might consider possible antecedents to privacy concerns. 
Just as users must evaluate susceptibility and severity to determine threat perceptions, they might also 
consider various factors when analyzing their privacy concerns. The amount of personal health 
information stored in complex systems, such as the Fitbit system, calls for further considering users’ 
privacy concerns. Constructs related to negative experiences with data breaches and privacy violations 
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could provide further insight into how users develop privacy concerns and their resulting avoidance 
motivations. 
9.1 Limitations 
While we make progress towards a model that allows one to better analyze technology threat avoidance, 
our study design has some limitations. Because we limited participation to first-year college students, 
respondents were approximately the same age. Future work should employ a more heterogeneous 
sample in order to improve generalizability.  
Another concern relates to the items we used to measure self-efficacy. As Carpenter et al. (2018) note, 
one might need to redesign the measures for self-efficacy to better fit the context of technology threat-
avoidance behaviors. We slightly modified the items that Liang and Xue (2010) used for this study, so they 
might not truly indicate users’ confidence in implementing a safeguarding measure. While we found self-
efficacy to be significant with this study group, prior inconsistencies suggest modifications to the self-
efficacy measure might be beneficial.  
9.2 Contributions and Implications for Future Research 
The results provide several contributions for researchers and organizations. By continuing to refine and 
evaluate the TTAT model in various contexts, researchers have access to a modified model that might 
better assess and determine user motivations and behaviors. Our model introduces the privacy construct 
to TTAT. Although we found that it was not significant with the group we examined, it deserves further 
evaluation. Theoretically considering it as an antecedent to susceptibility, severity, and threat might 
provide more insight into the role privacy plays in user motivations. 
We examined first-year students from 18 to 24 years old, which suggests that individuals around this age 
might have different perspectives on privacy of personal fitness systems. Also, due to their age, our 
participants may have had limited exposure to the risks of data and privacy breaches, which may have 
minimized their concerns about privacy. A larger study with a more heterogeneous group of participants 
might yield different responses regarding privacy concerns. 
Organizations can benefit from these results because the model provides a framework for understanding 
how users develop threat perceptions. In this study, placing perceived susceptibility as an antecedent to 
perceived severity indicated a significant effect on threat perceptions. As such, organizations should 
consider addressing users’ perceptions about susceptibility when determining the best method for 
motivating them to comply with security policies. Because this study constitutes the initial study to relocate 
perceived susceptibility in the threat calculus, future research in different contexts would assist in 
determining if this modification returns consistently significant results. 
Previous studies returned mixed results for the threat calculus (severity, susceptibility, and threat). In this 
work, we consider a revision to the threat calculus. Future research should comprehensively test all 
relationships between severity, susceptibility, and threat to determine if a mediated model might be more 
appropriate. 
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Appendix A: Factor Loadings 
Table A1. Factor Loadings 
 BEH CST EFF MOT PRI SEV SLF SUS THR 
BEH1 0.97 0.00 0.30 0.47 0.12 0.05 0.32 -0.06 0.15 
BEH2 0.96 -0.01 0.25 0.43 0.02 -0.04 0.36 -0.09 0.10 
CST1 -0.08 0.93 0.30 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.24 0.36 
CST4 0.08 0.90 0.36 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.41 0.08 0.19 
CST5 0.11 0.75 0.28 0.01 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.15 0.11 
EFF1 0.25 0.30 0.91 0.42 0.21 0.26 0.38 0.10 0.35 
EFF2 0.28 0.33 0.94 0.43 0.28 0.29 0.36 0.11 0.36 
EFF3 0.27 0.33 0.95 0.44 0.14 0.32 0.41 0.12 0.28 
EFF4 0.28 0.37 0.97 0.45 0.13 0.30 0.44 0.06 0.30 
EFF5 0.26 0.36 0.95 0.41 0.15 0.30 0.42 0.09 0.27 
EFF6 0.28 0.32 0.95 0.47 0.10 0.26 0.48 0.04 0.26 
MOT1 0.47 0.18 0.46 0.98 0.20 0.30 0.46 0.07 0.45 
MOT2 0.47 0.15 0.45 0.99 0.19 0.25 0.42 0.10 0.43 
MOT3 0.44 0.07 0.45 0.98 0.13 0.24 0.45 0.06 0.40 
PRI1 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.96 0.31 -0.09 0.44 0.28 
PRI2 0.06 0.26 0.19 0.15 0.94 0.32 -0.06 0.54 0.30 
PRI3 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.98 0.30 -0.12 0.50 0.34 
PRI4 0.05 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.98 0.30 -0.11 0.49 0.35 
SEV2 -0.08 0.17 0.22 0.09 0.27 0.80 0.02 0.33 0.25 
SEV3 0.03 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.92 0.19 0.39 0.53 
SEV4 0.07 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.23 0.89 0.28 0.33 0.51 
SEV5 -0.03 0.23 0.31 0.12 0.22 0.90 0.13 0.31 0.37 
SEV6 0.01 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.89 0.21 0.41 0.50 
SLF1 0.25 0.38 0.50 0.39 -0.06 0.22 0.85 0.01 0.28 
SLF2 0.31 0.30 0.40 0.39 -0.14 0.17 0.91 0.04 0.26 
SLF3 0.36 0.45 0.38 0.44 -0.06 0.20 0.91 0.05 0.38 
SLF4 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.31 -0.08 0.12 0.83 0.00 0.32 
SLF5 0.26 0.42 0.36 0.34 -0.11 0.23 0.92 0.02 0.35 
SLF6 0.37 0.30 0.39 0.47 -0.08 0.13 0.87 -0.05 0.29 
SUS1 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.37 0.36 -0.14 0.78 0.09 
SUS2 -0.08 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.51 0.32 -0.02 0.87 0.26 
SUS3 -0.12 0.14 0.05 -0.03 0.43 0.27 -0.06 0.92 0.12 
SUS4 -0.09 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.40 0.34 0.10 0.93 0.22 
SUS5 0.00 0.23 0.16 0.20 0.49 0.42 0.05 0.91 0.34 
SUS6 -0.07 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.44 0.37 0.09 0.85 0.32 
THR1 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.31 0.44 0.53 0.22 0.37 0.83 
THR2 0.05 0.20 0.32 0.35 0.32 0.49 0.30 0.34 0.86 
THR3 0.14 0.35 0.31 0.38 0.11 0.33 0.37 0.02 0.79 
THR4 0.07 0.32 0.30 0.39 0.16 0.28 0.29 0.09 0.83 
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Appendix B: Survey Instrument 
Table B1. Survey Instrument 
Construct Indicator Indicator text 
Perceived 
susceptibility 
SUS1 It is extremely likely that the Fitbit system will contain malware in the future. 
SUS2 The chances of getting malware on the Fitbit system are great. 
SUS3 There is a good possibility that the Fitbit system will contain malware at some point. 
SUS4 
There is a good chance that there will be malware on the Fitbit system at some point in 
the future. 
SUS5 The Fitbit system is at risk of becoming a victim of malware. 
SUS6 It is possible that the Fitbit system will experience a malware incident. 
Perceived 
severity 
SEV1 The consequences of losing my fitness data from the Fitbit system could be severe. 
SEV2 Malware could steal my fitness data from the Fitbit system without my knowledge. 
SEV3 My fitness data collected by malware could be misused by cyber criminals. 
SEV4 Malware could invade my privacy through the Fitbit system. 
SEV5 
My fitness data collected by malware could be subjected to unauthorized secondary 
use. 
SEV6 Fitness data collected by malware could be used to commit crimes against me. 
Perceived 
threat 
THR1 The consequences of getting malware on the Fitbit system threatens me. 
THR2 Malware is a danger to the Fitbit system. 
THR3 It would be awful if the Fitbit system was infected by malware. 
THR4 It would be risky to use the Fitbit system if it had malware. 
THR5 I am worried that using the Fitbit system will negatively affect me. 
THR6 I am scared that the Fitbit system will have harmful consequences for me. 
Privacy 
concerns 
PRI1 I am concerned that the information I submit to the Fitbit system could be misused. 
PRI2 I am concerned that a person can find private information about me on the Fitbit system. 
PRI3 
I am concerned about submitting information on the Fitbit system, because of what 
others might do with it. 
PRI4 
I am concerned about submitting information on the Fitbit system, because it could be 
used in a way I did not foresee. 
Self-efficacy 
SLF1 
I could successfully install and use security software if…I had seen someone else do it 
before trying myself. 
SLF2 
I could successfully install and use security software if…I could call someone for help if I 
got stuck. 
SLF3 
I could successfully install and use security software if…someone helped me get 
started. 
SLF4 
I could successfully install and use security software if…I had a lot of time to complete 
the task. 
SLF5 
I could successfully install and use security software if…someone showed me how to do 
it first. 
SLF6 




CST1 I don't have security software on the Fitbit system because I don't know how to get it. 
CST2 
I don’t have security software on the Fitbit system because it may cause problems with 
other programs. 
CST3 
I don’t' have security software on the Fitbit system because installing it is too much 
trouble. 
CST4 
I don't have security software on the Fitbit system because I'm not aware such software 
exists. 
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Table B1. Survey Instrument 
CST5 
I don't have security software on the Fitbit system because I don't think such software is 




Security software would be useful for detecting and removing malware from the Fitbit 
system. 
EFF2 Security software would increase my ability to protect the Fitbit system from malware. 
EFF3 
Security software would enable me to search for and remove malware from the Fitbit 
system faster. 
EFF4 
Security software would enhance my effectiveness in finding and removing malware on 
the Fitbit system. 
EFF5 
Security software would make it easier to search for and remove malware on the Fitbit 
system. 
EFF6 
Security software would increase my productivity in searching for and removing 
malware on the Fitbit system. 
Avoidance 
motivation 
MOT1 I intend to use security software to avoid malware breaches. 
MOT2 I will use security software to avoid malware breaches. 
MOT3 I plan to use security software to avoid malware breaches. 
Avoidance 
behavior 
BEH1 I run security software regularly to remove malware. 
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